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Saint Thomas Aquinas, the Thirteenth Century Catholic theologian
and philosopher was one of the first Medieval philosophers to attempt to
reconcile the newly re-introduced Aristotelian system with the Catholic
religious thought ofthe day. Aquinas' numerous commentaries on Aristotle
and his adoption of the Aristotelian thought form the basis for the whole of
Aquinian metaphysics (as well as the basic Aristotileanism which pervades
Aquinas' whole systematic philosophy), In this paper I will deal with a
specific yet fundamental principle of Aquinianmetaphysics-the principle
of individuation. On first reading of the Aquinian texts, the principle of
individuation appears to be stated succinctly, yet further investigation into
the concept of individuation reveals problems and ambiguities. As it is
necessary for an understanding of the problem of individuation in the
Aquinian system, I will start off with the basic ontology of Aquinas and then
will proceed with one interpretation of the ambiguities which exist in the
texts regarding the principle of individuation. I will then give a counter
interpretation that Aquinas might level against my interpretation and the
problems of my interpretation; finally, I will analyze any problems that arise
from the Aquinian response.

1. Primary Substance in Aristotle and Aquinas
The difficulty in dealing with systematic philosophy is that it is
difficult to know where to begin, since each concept is built upon previous
concepts and all of the concepts are fundamentally interrelated. Neverthe
less, I shall start by explicating Aquinas' fundamental ontology. Aquinas,
following Aristotle, points out that the world is made up of individual
things-or what Aquinas calls "primary substances", Socrates, Rover, and
the pine tree in my yard are all existing individual primary substances in the
world. I can ascribe certain qualities to these individual substances-I can,
for instance, say that Socrates is a philosopher, that Rover is fIisky, and that
the pine tree has snow on it. These are characteristics which apply
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specifically to these individuals. Although these primary substances are
complete individuals in themselves, they are not unique in themselves. for
they also possess characteristic essential properties which can be categori
cally ascribed to groups of primary substances. I can for example, say that
Socrates is a man, as is Plato, or that Rover and Spot are both dogs. There
is not just one pine tree in the world, but there are numerous trees-there are
whole forests of individual pine trees. 11Us introduces the question of
individuation: how can something be an individual thing yet also belong to
a certain category or class of things? How can Socrates be Socrates the
individual yet also belong to a more universal category of "Man"? The
problem ofindividuation will become clearer when the ontological structure
of the primary substance is explicated.
Aristotle and Aquinas' ontology try to explain how it is that there
exist individual primary substances which exist both as individuals and as
members of a larger non-individual or universal group. Their explanations
or responses to this question characterize the basic ontological composition
of the primary substance itself. What must be remembered when consider
ing the ontology of Aquinas is that he continually stresses the unity of the
primary substance. Individual things exist in the world, and the ontology
which Aquinas proposes is ,ffi intellectual construct which explains the
composing factors of the primary substance. Aquinas wlites that "[the
intellect] is capable by nature of separating things which are united in
reality" (Commentary on the Metaphysics, 491).
Primary substances, for Aquinas, can be intellectually grasped as
consisting of three major components-substantial form, prime matter,
accidental forms, which combined, have existence (sec figure 1). 111e
substantial form of a primary substance is that which gives the primary
substance its underlying stl1lcture. The form is the universal component of
the primary substance and makes the primary substance what it is, as well
as giving it its commonality with other things of its type. The substantial
form of Socrates and the substantial fonn ofPlato are identical-both have
the same substantial form "Man". Rover and Spot have the identical form
of"Dog" which they share with each other and with all other dogs. The Conn
ofthe primary substance ofa tree is obviously different from both "Dog" and
"Man" and can be described as the form of "Tree". The substantial form is
the generalized principle which makes a thing what it is and subsumes it
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under a universal category. The fonn, however, as will be seen, is not the
complete essence of a primary substance.
The second component of the primary substance is that of which a
thing is made-this is prime matter (materia prima). The primary
substance is not just pure structure; it is a structure of something. Prime
matter, then, is the element of a primary substance which becomes struc
tured by a substantial fonn. An analogy which helps to explain the basic
relation of matter and fonn in a primary substance is the analogy of the
sculptor and modeling clay. The sculptor cannot sculpt anything without
clay, just as the fonn needs to be the structure of some "stuff'. This analogy
breaks down, however, in that the clay itself already has some type of
structure even before the sculptor is able to sculpt it. Prime matter, in the
Aquinian system is completely formless and is, in itself, non-existent. This
wi1l be explained later on, as will Aquinas' position that matter is the
principle of individuation.
Matter and fonn hold a special relationship in the Aquinian system
in that they are the essential components of a primary substance. Aquinas
believes that we can abstract from the primary substance the concepts of
matter and fonn and come up with an intellectual construct of the essence
ofwhat the primary substance is. Aquinas also calls this essence a secondary
substance (see figure 2). The secondary substance, or essence of a thing, is
not simply the substantial fonn, for as I explained, structure without
something to structure is meaningless. A sculptor without clay (or iron or
stone, etc.) is not a sculptor. The fonn indeed is that which gives structure
and makes a thing belong to a certain universal category, but the essence of
the primary substance, for Aquinas, involves a material component. This
also will become clearer when I discuss the different ways in which matter
can be considered.
That matter and fonn do not constitute the entirety of a primary
substance is evident in that we ascribe characteristics to individual primary
substances which are part.icular to the individual but not necessarily compo
nents of every member of the universal category to which the individual
belongs. These characteristics introduce the third component of a primary
substance-accidental fonns. When, for example, I said that Socrates is a
philosopher, that Rover is frisky, or that the pine tree has snow on it, I am
saying nothing that applies universally or essentially to the class to which

AQUINAS' PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION

57

these individuals belong. The sentences. "Socrates is a Man" and "Socrates
is a philosopher", do not predicate of Socrates in the same way. In the first
case, the predicate is an essential or substantial characteristic which tells us
the essential nature of what Socrates is. Socrates could remain Socrates if
he stopped philosophizing, but he would not remain Socrates if he ceased
being a man. Put simply, accidental forms are exactly these characteristics
which tell us not what a thing is, but tell us specific characteristics of an
individual. Aquinas writes. "substantial form differs from the accidental
form in this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be simply but
to be such" (Summa Theologicae la. Q76 art. 4). Aquinas, following
Aristotle, says that there are nine accidental forms which compose the
primary substance; these are: quantity, quality, relation, place, time.
position, habit, action and passion. As will be seen, only quantity plays a
central role in the principle of individuation and for this reason it is
unnecessary to consider the other eight accidental forms.
Lastly, the primary substance has existence. Whereas the substan
tial form tells us what a thing is, the existence component tell us that a thing
is. Existence is not a descriptive quality or property of a primary substance,
but Aquinas wants us to realize that he is discussing things which do exist
in reality. The distinction between essence and existence is treated at length
by Aquinas (as in On Being and Essence) but is not ofcrucial importance to
this analysis.
II. Matter and Individuation
Having considered the ontology of the individual primary sub
stance, my attention will now shift to the principle ofindividuation. As I said
before, individual primary substances exist in the world; it only remains to
be discovered what makes the primary substances to be so individuated. In
the Aquinian system, the substantial form is a universal property which
applies categorically to different primary substances. Things of a class have
identical universal forms. The question then arises as to how the universal
substantial form becomes instantiated in primary substances yet remains
universal. How can Socrates and Plato have the same universal form,
"Man". without being the same man? What principle. then, makes all things
that have identical substantial forms individuals? This is the problem of the
principle of individuation.
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Aquinas' answer, put simply, is that "matter is the principle of
individuation" (On Bein~ and Essence. 74). Aquinas believes that matter is
the component of a primary substance which individualizes the universal
substantial fonn. Aquinas does. however, believe that the "principle of
individuation is not matter taken in just any way whatever, but only
designated matter" COn Being and Essence, 75). It is obvious from this
passage that Aquinas views the concept of matter in several distinct ways.
In fact. although he writes that we can identify "two kinds of matter"
(Summa TheolQgicae 1a. Q85, art 1). we can in fact distinguish three ways
in which Aquinas writes of matter-prime matter (materia prima),
nondesignated matter (materia communis) and designated matter (materia
signata). To understand exactly what Aquinas means by designated matter
and how it acts as a principle of individuation, it is necessary also to
understand what Aquinas means when he talks of matter in other ways.
In his commentary on Aquinas' On Being and Essence, Joseph
Babik gives an excellent overview ofthe three ways in which matter can be
viewed in the Aquinian system:
The difference among the three is a difference of
greater and lesser universality, or, to put this in another
way, a difference oflesser and greater detail in intellectual
grasp and expression. Thus. to speak of prime matter, or
perhaps better of matter as prime, is to speak of what the
matters of all individual composed substances have in
common. To speak ofnon-designated matter, or of matter
as non designated, is to speak of what the matters of all
individuals of a same species have in common. Lastly, to
speak of designated matter, or of matter as designated, is
to speak of what is proper to and distinctive ofthe matter of
some determinate, individual, composed substance.
Whether we speak of prime matter or of nondesignated
matter, or of designated matter, we are talking about the
same thing ..."(On Being and Essence, 78).
Prime matter. ormatter viewed as prime, as was stated before, is one
ofthe components ofthe composed primary substance. Aquinas writes that
prime matter "lacks all forms which give it defIniteness" and since it "does
not exist alone in reality be itself' (Gilby, 135), it is merely an intellectual
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construct. Prime matter is a purely intellectual concept which does not and
cannot, as being fonn-Iess, exist except in a primary substance as an
intellectually constructed component. Aquinas speaks of prime matter in
itself as non-existent and property-less to again stress the unicity of the
primary substance. Just as the fonn needs something to structure, prime
matter is inherently dependent on some fonnal aspect for existence. The
primary substance is a complete whole and its ontological parts exist
separately only as intellectual constructs. Aquinas writes that only "through
the fonn, which is the actuality ofmatter, [does] matter become something
actual" (On Being and Essence, 70).
Another way oflooking at matter for Aquinas is matter considered
as common or nondesignated. Matter in this sense, like prime matter, is an
intellectual construct, but whereas prime matter is matter considered as
devoid of any fonn whatsoever, nondesignated matter is matter conceived
as being structured by some fonn. Matter as nondesignated is the abstract
material component which belongs to the secondary substance or the
essence of a primary substance. Our concept of a secondary substance or
essence is derived from the intellectual process of considering a variety of
primary substances all of the same type. The concept of nondesignated
matter arises out of a realization that prime matter and substantial form are
always united to fonn the basis of a primary substance. To use Aquinas'
example "it is nondesignated matter which is placed in the definition of
man" ( On Being and Essence, 75). Individual men such as Socrates and
Plato exist as individual primary substances and as such constitute a
composite of prime matter, substantial fonn, and accidental fonns. The
essence of both Socrates and Plato makes them men; they share the same
common fonn ofHMan". The essence ofwhat a "Man" is, however, includes
general, material characteristics-we know that men are not just fonns, but
have actual bodies. Nondesignated matter is !he intellectual construct
expressing the realization !hat men are not just formal entities but are
necessarily composed of some specific matter. Aquinas makes this point
when he writes that "This bone and this flesh are not placed in the definition
ofman, but bone and flesh absolutely. These latter are man's nondesignated
matter" (On Being and Essence. 75). Nondesignated matter, then, is an
abstract intellectual realization that the definition ofwhat material!hings are
necessarily entails a material component.
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The third way in which Aquinas speaks of matter is as designated
matter. Whereas nondesignated matter is inherent in a general way in the
essence of a subject, and prime matter is also a mental construct which does
not exist in itself, designated matter is the matter that is existent in the world
and is readily apparent to us. Aquinas writes that "the essence of man and
the essence of [the individual] Socrates do not differ except as the
nondesignated from the designated" (On Being and Essence, 81). The
definition or essence ofall men refers to matter viewed as nondesignated, or
to a material component of which individual men are individual instances.
Designated matter, though. is the specific matter ofthe individual. Follow
ing Aquinas' example, the designated matter I have means that I am
composed ofthis bone and this flesh, not as bone and flesh considered as a
generalized concept which all men, as men, must have.
III. Designated Matter and Individuation
Since the "principle of individuation is not matter taken in any way
whatever, but only as designated matter" (On Being and Essence. 75), this
paper's focus on the principle of individuation requires a more in-depth
analysis of the nature of designated matter. Aquinas defines designated
matter when he writes. "I call that matter designated which is considered
under determined dimensions" (On Being and Essence, 75). Now dimen
sion, for Aquinas, arises from (or can be considered as) one of the nine
accidents-specifically the ilrst accidental form, quantity. Aquinas often
refers to quantity using two different terms-numerical quantity, which
seems to be a common usage indicating "how much" of something there is.
Secondly, Aquinas writes of quantity as "dimensive quantity" (Summa
Theologicae 3a, Q77, 2). It is this latter type of quantity which interests us
in this discussion of individuation. For, as Aquinas writes, "[b]ecause the
category of dimensive quantity alone carries this separation of specifically
similar units, dimension would appear to lie at the root of individual
multiplication" (Gilby, 160). Thus designated matter can be defined further
to be matter considered as being under determined dimension, where
dimension is itselfof the accidental form ofquantity. Further support for this
comes from Efrem Bettoni when he writes, "The Thomistic solution, which
places the principle of individuation in materia signata quantitate [matter
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signified by quantity]. is well known" (Bettoni, 59). When Aquinas writes
that designated matter is the principle of individuation, he means materia
signata quantitate, or matter as signified by quantity.
The problem of Aquinas' view of designated matter or materia
signata quantitate as the principle of individuation arises out of the way in
which the accidental forms (of which quantity is the first) inhere in the
primary substance. In On Being and Essence and in his Commentary on The
Metaphysics of Aristotle, Aquinas seems to talk as if matter and form
combined together compose, in themselves, a type of self-subsisting sub
stance. Aquinas writes, "But that to which an accident comes is a being
complete in itself and subsisting in its own existence" (On Being and
Essenoo. 239), and Bobik comments that the accidents "depend on sub
stances, as on a subject, for thei r beings" (On Being and Essence, 50). In the
Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Aquinas criticizes the pre
Socratics for believing that accidents reside in anything other than this
"subsisting substance". this union ofprime matter and substantial form. He
writes, "And they (the pre-Socratics] called those things forms which we call
accidents, for example, quantities and qualities, whose proper subject is not
firstmalterbut the composite substance" (Commentary on the Metaphysics,
499). Quantity is an accidental form, which as an accident, must also depend
on this "composite" of prime matter and substantial form. The onl y way !hat
an accidental form can have existence is through a substance which is
composed of form and matter.
On this account, then, the concept of designated matter already
includes a material component and a formal component. Designated matter,
as Aquinas says, is matter "considered under determined dimensions" (Qn
Being and Essence, 75), or as was shown, as materia signata quantitate.
But quantity, ordimensive quantity, is an accident, and as such, necessarily
depends on this unified and subsisting composite subject for its being.
Designated matter then, is an existing substance composed of substantial
fonn, prime matter, and the accidental form ofquantity. Yetin the Aquinian
ontology, this definition already specifies a primary substance. That is to
say, if my account is correct, and form and matter together with the accident
of quantity constitute the definition of designated matter, then designated
matter cannot be a principle of individuation for a primary substance
because it just is a primary substance. A primary substance, remember, is
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something composed of substantial form, prime matter, accidental forms
and which is existent. But is not this precisely the definition of designated
matter?
The problem. then, is how designated matter, which can already be
considered a primary substance be the principle ofindividuation ofprimary
substances. The fonn is the universal component of a primary substance
both Plato and Socrates, as men, have identical fonns but are also individu
als. Designated matter, considered on my account (see figure 3), cannot be
the principle ofindividuation because designated matter contains in its very
definition a formal aspect and can already be considered as being a primary
substance. If we view designated matter as having the components of a
primary substance-substantial form, prime matter and an accident (quan
tity), then Aquinas is begging the question of individuation. Designated
matter cannot be the principle of individuation of the primary substance
because substantial form, prime matter and accidental forms are contained
already in the definition of designated matter.
My argument as given can be most concisely summed up in nine
points:
1. Primary substances are individuals, but also
belong to universalized groups.
2. Primary substances have the components of
subsLantial form, prime maLter, accidental form,
and are existent.
3. Substantial form subsumes the primary substance
under a universal category.
4. Designated matter is the principle that individu
ates the primary substance.
5. Designated matLeris matter signified by dimensive
quantity.
6. Dimensive quantity is an accidental form.
7. "But that to which an accident comes is a being
complete in itself and subsisting in its own
ex.istence"(On Being and Essence, 239}-orthe
union between prime matter and substantial form
is the subject in which the accidents inhere.
8. Designated matter or materia signata quanti
tate, is already an existing composite substance
composed of substantial form, prime matter and
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the accident of quantity.
9. This, however can be considered a primary
substance and designated matter, having sub
stantial fonn, prime matter and the accidental
fonn of quantity in its definition begs the ques
tion of individuation of the primary substance.
IV. Aquinian Response
Because of the ambiguities that exist in many of the passages that
deal with quantity, designated matter, and the principle of individuation, it
is certainly possible that my interpretation is incorrect. How, then, might
Aquinas respond to my argument and which specific point[s] might he
attack? I will lay out a possible Aquinian response to my interpretation and
then note any problems that arise from this Aquinian response.
Aquinas would most likely attack my argument at my eighth point;
he would probably fmd fault with my definition of designated matter as
necessarily entailing some type of formal aspect. In some passages, as I have
shown, Aquinas seems to imply that matter designated by dimensive
quantity necessarily entails some type of substantial form. Dimcnsive
quantity, as an accidental form, could only be considered in relation to the
composite of matter and form. In other passages, however, Aquinas seems
to imply that quantity has as its subject not the union of substantial form and
prime matter, but rather prime matter itself. Aquinas writes that "since the
parts ofa substance are matter and form, certain accidents follow principally
on form, certain others follow principally on matter" COn Being and
Essence, 240). Earlier in my analysis, I claimed that Aquinas proposed the
inherence of accidents in a wholly composed substance; the passage just
quoted suggests more ofa distinction between particular accidents as having
their subject in either one part of the composite substance or the other. In
the Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Aquinas makes this
distinction clear when he writes that some accidents can be considered as
"something flowing from itt:; matter, and th.en it is quantity; oras something
flowing from its form, and thenitis quality" (Commentary on the Metaphys
~,346). I have not been able to find a text which gives a complete list of
the exact subject ofthe other seven accidents-which accidents "flow" from
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matter and which from fonn, but from this passage it seems clear that
quantity is to have as its subject not the union of both matter and fonn, but
matter only.
Aquinas writes in The Summa Theologicae that "dimensive quan
tity is the very first accident which affects a material thing" (Summa
Theologica~ 3a, Q77, art 2) and then makes the even stronger claim that
"quantity has its basis in matter, parts of a quantity are part of a thing's
matter" (Summa Theologicae 3a, Q90, art 2), That Aquinas is drawing a fine
line between the subject of the nine accidents is obvious; accidents do not
have the composite as their su bject. but have one component or the other as
their subjects. Aquinas, when he writes of accidents in this way, seems to
undermine my proposition that designated matter necessarily has a formal
component. By differentiating between accidents attaching to form and
those properto matter, Aquinas drives a wedge between matter and fonn in
my interpretation of designated matter.
On this reading, Aquinas would perhaps defme designated matter,
or matter characterized by quantity, as prime matter with the accident of
quantity attached to it, this being made possible only by the union of prime
matter with substantial form. Put another way, the union ofform and prime
matter is the necessary condition for quantity to be ascribed to matter, but
the form is not included in the definition of materia signata quantitate.
Only in the union of form and matter can matter be said to be quantified, but
quantity is not given attached to the form nor is form contained in the
definition ofdesignated matter. Any accidental form arises out ofthe union
ofprime matter and substantial form-for accidents "depend on substances.
as on a subject, for their being" (On Being and Essence, 50)-but it is not
the case that the individual accidents inhere in the composite as a whole, but
rather, to either prime matter or substantial form, not matter and form.
Quantity is not given by the form nor does it inhere in the form, but rather,
is made possible by the union of matter and form.
Designated malter, then, is prime matter with an accident of
quantity, made possible by the fact that matter and form are so united.
Aquinas speaks this way when he writes that "from the fact that matter has
corporeal existence through forms, it immediately follows that there are
dimensions in matter" CPt< Anima, 115), and that "matter, so far as it is
understood to have substantial existence as a perfection ... can, therefore, be
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regarded as the subject of accidents" (De Anima, 115). Substantial form
need only be included in the defInition of designated matter insofar as the
union with matter is the necessary condition of matter to be quantified.
Designated matter, in this Aquinian response, does not include a substantial
form as a composing factor, but only as such that its (substantial fonn's)
union with prime matter brings the possibility of prime matter as quantified
(See figure 4).
In this possible Aquinian response to my position, designated
matter as quantified matter can, it seems, be regarded as the principle of
individuation. The definition of designated matter does not contain the
fonn, and so this definition does not beg the question of individuation. So
Aquinas can save the principle of individuation in this way, yet this new
position has other serious consequences for Aquinas' system. On this
account, quantity clearly plays the leading role in individuation. Matter with
out quantity is not designated; matter as quantified, or under detennined
dimensive quantity, is designated matter. Quantity then, is the prinCipal
factor of individuation. Quantity, however, is an accident and this would
seem to run counter to Aquinas' position that "It is obvious, then, that the
principle of individuation is not a collection of accidents (as some said), but
designated matter, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] has stated" (Commentary
on the Metaphysics. 602). Designated matter, as was shown, however, has,
as its main component dimensive quantity, which is accidental. Designated
matter, or materia signata quantitate, is accidental in nature. This, then,
makes the principle of individuation contingent on an accidental fonn
individuation is accidental.
This characterization of designated matter as accidental and its
inherent problem in the Aquinian system is the topic for a completely
different paper; yet it still needs to be pointed out as a definite problem for
Aquinas and was, in fact, a problem addressed by succeeding Medieval
philosophers such as Duns Scotus. Duns Scotus saw a problem inherent in
the Aquinian definition of designated matter as depending on an accidental
fonn. Bettoni, in his book on Duns Scotus writes, "His [Scotus'] criticism
is mainly based on the fact that quantity is an accident" (Bettoni, 60). Scotus,
not contented with the accidental nature of designated matter in Aquinas'
thought, responded by positing his famous prinCiple of individuation
"Haecceity". Bettoni continues that in regards to the principle of individu
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ation, "Duns Scotus has recourse to his theory of 'haecceity', or thisness"
(Bettoni, 60). Briefly, Haecceity is a unique principle of the fonn which
gives to each individual thing its individual perfection and is not dependent
upon a material principle.
So on my interpretation of the often ambiguous texts, designated
matter begs the question ofindividuation and the principle of individuation
remains as yet to be discovered. The Aquinian response reclaims for
designated matter its status as the principle of individuation, but at the same
time it raises a new problem-specifically the problem that Duns Scotus
confronted-that the prinCiple of individuation in Aquinas is acciden
tal.
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